Archive for June, 2012

How to Make a Decoy Wallet

June 20, 2012

One thing that I carry around with me when I go to the city or travel overseas is a decoy wallet.

A decoy wallet is a wallet whose purpose is to fool a would-be mugger or pickpocket from stealing your real wallet.

The theory is, if you’re ever threatened to give up your wallet, you pull out the decoy and let them take that instead of your real stash of money, IDs, and credit cards (which are concealed somewhere else on your person).

In this article I’ll show you my decoy wallet and give you some tips on how to make your own.

My decoy wallet

Here’s a pic of my decoy wallet:

From initial investigation, it appears to be an actual wallet: It’s worn out, has credit cards in it, pictures of the wife and kids, a few rewards cards, and some cash (a $10 bill, a $5 bill, and five $1s).

While the $20 bucks is real and will work for them, that’s about it.

The credit cards though are inactive, the pictures of the wife and kids are not mine (I printed out a nice picture of some lady and kids on photopaper), and the rest is just a filling of old receipts, rewards cards, and other worthless items.

If I get pick-pocketed:

Well, then the worse thing that happens is my pride is a bit hurt and I come away with a lesson to be better aware of my surroundings.

If I am mugged:

Here is my plan:

  • If I have the option to throw the wallet and beat feet to a public area, then I’ll do it, otherwise…
  • If I have nowhere to go and they take the wallet and run, then that works as well.
  • If they force me to stay while rummaging through it, then I will prepare myself for a possible escalation of force. If the ruse is enough to fool them and they leave me alone, it’s a good day.
  • If they escalate after that point, hopefully the time it takes for them to figure out they want to tango, I’ve prepared myself enough to meet their escalation with my own (preparing my carry weapon).

This is my own continuum of force. You are welcome to create one that you feel comfortable with.

For me, the decoy wallet really serves two purposes: as a ruse for them to hopefully leave me alone, or as a momentary distraction that allows me a bit of time to prepare for an unavoidable physical confrontation.

Remember, in situations where seconds count you don’t want to be a statistic because you hesitated.

How to make a decoy wallet

Making a decoy wallet is a pretty simple process. Here are some pointers that you’ll want to consider.

  • If you have an old/beat-up wallet, use that. The more you can make it look like it’s your real wallet the better
  • Add to it inactive or expired credit cards, fake family pics (of kids, spouse etc), a decent but small amount of cash, store rewards cards you don’t use, some old store receipts you don’t need etc. Anything to add to the ruse and make the wallet look “full”.
  • Keep your real set of cards, IDs, and cash in a concealed place on your body (not in your pockets)
  • When you need to make a purchase, use the decoy wallet. If you need more than what’s in the decoy, go to the restroom and put what cash/card you need from your concealed place and reverse the process when done.You don’t want to go digging down into your crotch for your “concealed cash” at the register — not only will the register person think you’re a weirdo but any would-be mugger watching you will now know where you hide the real stuff…and may just go looking.
  • When stocking your decoy wallet, keep in mind that some expired/inactive cards will use the same credit-card number as your current one. Confirm that’s not the case since the criminal could potentially still use the card by trying out various expiration dates.
  • I wouldn’t recommend putting any notes in your wallet like “Sorry Dude, You’ve Been Punked” or “Nice Try Loser” or filling it with monopoly money. If the perp makes you stay there while checking out what’s inside it could just make things worse for you…

A word to the ladies

For women that don’t carry wallets per se, the principles still apply: Keep your important collection of cash, cards, and IDs somewhere concealed on you. (I know some ladies who can conceal quite a bit in their bras).

In your purse you’ll put a decoy wallet in there and either hand that over to them or the whole purse (you just can’t sweat about losing your MAC makeup).

It really comes down to awareness

Ultimately, mugging is a crime of surprise. Don’t forget the importance of keeping your head on a swivel and always being aware of your surroundings.

CIA ‘seriously damaged’ China’s overseas spy network, sources say

June 20, 2012

Ministry of State Security branch office in Hubei Province, China
A high-level Chinese security official, who was arrested earlier this year in China for spying for the United States, compromised several Chinese agents operating on American soil, according to sources. Reuters news agency, which broke the initial story of the Chinese official’s arrest earlier this month, published last week a lengthy update on the spy affair. The article quoted “two sources with direct knowledge on the matter”, who claimed the issue was considered serious enough in Beijing to prompt the personal intervention of Chinese President Hu Jintao. Jintao, who is also General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, personally ordered an investigation into the case, said Reuters. The investigation focused on China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), China’s primary intelligence agency, where the accused spy was reportedly working at the time of his arrest. Although Chinese media have remained silent on the issue, the arrested official is said to have worked as a senior aide to MSS Vice Minister Lu Zhongwei. The Reuters article alleges that the investigation, which is said to be continuing, has concluded that the aide had been a paid informant of the US Central Intelligence Agency, and that the information he provided to the CIA included “political, economic and strategic intelligence”. But the sources also told Reuters that some of the government secrets that the MSS aide gave the CIA related to China’s network of spies operating on American soil. The latest Reuters article strengthens the widespread view that the latest espionage scandal caused serious damage to China’s espionage network in the US. Some observers now argue that this represents China’s most damaging espionage scandal since 1985, when Yu Qiangsheng, a senior Chinese intelligence official, defected to the United States. His high-profile defection led to the eventual arrest by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of Larry Wu-Tai Chin. Chin, a Chinese language translator working for the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service, killed himself in prison in 1986, shortly before he was sentenced for selling classified US government documents to China from 1952 to 1985. American government officials have declined commenting on the case, as has China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The MSS, which some say is the world’s largest intelligence agency, has no website or official spokesperson.

South African intel officials faked threats to increase spy budget

June 20, 2012

ANC centenary celebrations
The tendency of some spy agencies to overstate security threats in order to secure governmental funds is hardly novel. But officials in the South African Secret Service appear to have gone a step further: they allegedly paid some of their informants to make bogus threats against the government, in order to prompt an increase in counterterrorist funding. According to Pretoria News, which is owned by The Independent, South Africa’s largest newspaper consortium, the bogus threats were aimed at creating “a false impression of imminent, unprecedented attacks on black people and African National Congress (ANC) members”. The ultimate goal of the perpetrators, says the paper, was to benefit personally from an increase in counterterrorist funding, which is said to run at around R600 million (US$72 million) per year. The plan was carefully designed to coincide with the run-up to the ANC’s centennial celebrations, which took place in January of this year. In one case, an informant was paid by Secret Service officials to record a video message threatening an uprising by whites against the country’s black-majority government, unless the latter put an end to the occupation of white-owned farmland by landless peasants. One video, which made “chilling threats” against black Africans and members of the ANC, was made publicly available on YouTube, causing widespread concern and prompting the government to beef up security measures around ANC facilities in several areas of the country. The threats also led to an extensive government investigation. During stage two of the plan, the culprits asked for cash funds in order to remunerate a number of informants that had allegedly tipped them off about the individuals or groups behind the threatening videos. However, instead of using the money to pay off the informants, the intelligence officers used it to enrich themselves. According to Pretoria News, government investigators have produced a five-page report about the scam, which lists the names of the perpetrators and the informants, and details the methods they used to secure government funds. The paper says it spoke to an unnamed “senior national police official”, who said that some of the perpetrators had agreed to collaborate with government investigators in exchange for immunity from prosecution. The revelation of this latest scam is expected to fuel widespread concern about the increasing corruption in South Africa’s security and intelligence agencies.

‘Massive expansion’ in US covert operations in Africa

June 20, 2012

US military base in Djibouti
The United States administration of President Barack Obama is implementing a near-unprecedented expansion of covert operations by American military forces throughout Africa, aimed at a host of armed groups deemed extremist by Washington. A lead article published yesterday in The Washington Post quotes over a dozen unnamed American and African officials, as well as military contractors, who refer to the US military-led effort as Project CREEKSAND. It allegedly involves secret operations in several African countries, conducted out of a large network of small air bases located in strategic locations around the continent. According to The Post, most of the airplanes used in Project CREEKSAND are small, unarmed, disguised to look like private aircraft, and bear no military markings or government insignia. In reality, however, they carry sophisticated electronic equipment designed to collect signals intelligence, while some are used to transport US Special Forces troops during capture or kill missions. The paper quotes an unnamed “former senior US commander […] involved in setting up the [air bases] network”, who alleges that the US government has built about a dozen such bases throughout Africa since 2007. These secret air bases are located in countries such as Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, South Sudan, Kenya, and Seychelles. Most of the US personnel involved in Project CREEKSAND consists of Special Operations forces tasked with “training foreign security forces [and] performing aid missions”. However, The Post alleges that there are also small teams of US operatives who are “dedicated to tracking and killing suspected terrorists”. Their targets include groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabaab in Somalia, Nigeria’s Boko Haram, as well as Azawad, the newly established state in northern Mali, whose independence was declared recently by Islamist separatists. Some US forces are also involved in gathering intelligence on Joseph Kony, the elusive Ugandan leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army. Interestingly, the article mentions skepticism by some critics, who wonder why the US military, rather than the Central Intelligence Agency, is in charge of Project CREEKSAND. Others warn that the groups targeted by the Obama administration in Africa are local in scope and fight for regional goals, not global, and thus do not pose any direct threat to the US. Thus, by interfering in their local religious or nationalist struggles, Washington risks creating unwanted backlash. The Post says that it sent an email with several questions about Project CREEKSAND to the US Pentagon’s Africa Command, which refused to provide “specific operational details”.

Ex-diplomat: US thinks Israeli spy Pollard was not acting alone

June 20, 2012

Itamar Rabinovich
One of Israel’s former ambassadors to Washington has told a radio program that United States officials suspect Jonathan Jay Pollard, an American who spied for Israel in the 1980s, was not acting alone. Itamar Rabinovich, who was Tel Aviv’s most senior diplomat on US soil from 1993 to 1996, told Israel Radio on Monday that this is probably the reason behind Washington’s refusal to release the imprisoned spy. Pollard was a US Navy intelligence analyst who spied for Israel, in exchange for money, from 1984 until his arrest in 1986. Many in US counterintelligence consider him one of the most damaging double spies in American history. But he is widely viewed as a hero in Israel, and Israelis, as well as many pro-Israel Americans, are actively pressuring the US administration of President Barack Obama to release him. According to Rabinovich, however, the main reason behind the US refusal to release Pollard is that officials in the US Intelligence Community think that Israel has concealed the full extent of his activities on US soil. Furthermore, Rabinovich said in his interview that Washington believes Israel has shielded other Americans who either collaborated with Pollard or worked alongside him at the time. “They suspect that he wasn’t the only one, that there were additional Pollards”, said Rabinovich, adding that “Israel, despite its promises, did not reveal all the cards in this case and in similar cases”. The former ambassador said that, to his knowledge, “Israel [still] hasn’t said everything” to the Americans about the extent of Pollard’s espionage activities on US soil. Expounding on this, he said that “the claim concerning the enormous damage done to the Americans” by Pollard’s activities is one thing, “but there is also a hidden [claim], which is not voiced openly, but is implied”. The Americans, said Rabinovich, are “punishing Israel at Jonathan Pollard’s expense. They are angry with Israel more than with Pollard”. Asked whether there were indeed other Israeli spies working with Pollard, Rabinovich replied “I fear so”. But in a subsequent email to the Agence France Presse news agency, Rabinovich said some of his comments to the radio station had been misunderstood. He told the news agency that that his remark “I fear so” referred solely to his concern that adversaries of Israel in the US were exploiting the lack of full disclosure by Israel to keep Pollard imprisoned. In response to a question from his interviewer about whether he thought Israeli spies are conducting espionage on US soil today, Rabinovich said he doubted it.

Intelligence News YOU may have missed

June 20, 2012

Jeffrey Paul Delisle
►►Germany charges alleged Moroccan spy. German Federal prosecutors on Tuesday said the suspect, identified only as Moroccan-German dual national Mohammed B., was spying for Moroccan intelligence on supporters of the POLISARIO Front, which seeks independence for the Western Sahara region. They say he was paid €22,800 for the work in 2011, and then falsified invoices to claim he had done work for Morocco’s state airline to disguise where the money originated. He was arrested in February but released from custody on June 5 after prosecutors say he admitted to the charges.
►►Delisle spy case in Canada adjourned until July 4. The case of Canadian navy intelligence officer Jeffrey Paul Delisle, who is accused of espionage, has been adjourned until next month, because his lawyer, Mike Taylor, says he needs more time to review information about his client. According to Taylor, much of the information he has received so far from the Canadian government has been redacted because of security concerns. Moreover, he said that the “voluminous” amount of information has to be vetted by several justice and intelligence agencies before it can be handed over to him, slowing down the process of moving the case forward.
►►Obama to deny Israeli calls for Pollard’s release. The administration of US President Barack Obama has indicated that it will reject any appeal by senior Israeli political figures to commute the life sentence of convicted Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard. “Our position has not changed and will not change today”, White House spokesman Jay Carney told reporters at his daily briefing last week. “Mr. Pollard was convicted of extremely serious crimes”, he said.


Sir Dominic Asquith
►►Algeria sentences man to 20 years for spying. Noureddine Benziane, an Algerian psychologist and expert on anti-terrorism, has been sentenced in absentia to 20 years in jail on conviction of spying after a stay in Iraq. According to the charge sheet, Benziane went to Iraq on humanitarian missions several times between 2005 and 2007, but he allegedly founded a training camp for potential suicide bombers of several nationalities. Benziane later acknowledged contacting several diplomatic missions in Algiers to give them details of the information he had recovered. However, he neglected to inform the Algerian security services of his findings, according to his prosecutors.
►►Egypt pulls TV ads warning foreigners may be spies. An unnamed Egyptian media official says authorities have pulled a television advertisement that warned against talking to foreigners who may be spies, after criticism that they fueled xenophobia. The official said Sunday that the ads were aired on state TV and private networks for a few days before Minister of Information Ahmed Anis ordered them off the air.
►►British diplomat attacked in Libya. Britain’s ambassador to Libya, Sir Dominic Asquith, was in a convoy of cars that came under attack in the eastern city of Benghazi on Monday, in what British media described as the most serious assault on foreign targets in Libya to date. The attack came amid mounting concern for the welfare of an Australian lawyer and three colleagues working for the International Criminal Court after they were detained in Libya. They were accused of spying when they visited Saif al-Islam Gaddafi.

Founder of Polish special forces unit found shot dead in Warsaw

June 20, 2012

Slawomir Petelicki
Polish authorities have launched an official investigation into the death of a senior retired military intelligence officer who founded Poland’s best-known special forces unit. The body of Brigadier General Slawomir Petelicki, who held senior intelligence positions in both communist and post-communist Poland, was discovered by his wife on Saturday. It was reportedly lying on a pool of blood on the floor of the garage located under his apartment in the Mokotow district of Polish capital Warsaw. Polish media said on Monday that Petelicki’s body carried a single gunshot wound to the head and that a gun was found at the site. Petelicki, 66, had joined Poland’s Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1969 and was soon afterwards posted as a “Military Attaché” at the Polish consulate in New York. He later served in a similar capacity at the Polish embassy in Stockholm, Sweden, as well as in China and North Vietnam, among other countries. He managed to survive the post-communist purges in Poland’s intelligence community, and in 1990 he was assigned to a brand new special forces unit codenamed JW 2305. Through his leadership, the obscure unit was eventually transformed into the GROM (meaning ‘thunder’ in Polish) Special Forces regiment, which he led from 1990 until 1995. Initially, the existence of GROM was kept secret and was not openly acknowledged by the Polish government until 1994. Polish authorities said on Monday that they were treating Petelicki’s death as a case of suspected suicide. But many of the late intelligence officer’s colleagues and friends have voiced skepticism about the alleged suicide, claiming that the Brigadier General had not seemed depressed, and that he was not the kind of person who would contemplate taking his own life. One of Petelicki’s close friends, Polish politician Marek Siwiec, told Polish media that, for him, “suicide doesn’t quite fit”. Poland’s former Prime Minister Leszek Miller added that, in his view, “men like [Petelicki] don’t commit suicide”. A spokeswoman from the Warsaw District Prosecution said on Monday that the late intelligence officer’s body had been taken to a forensic laboratory for a post-mortem analysis. The results are expected later this week.

The Software Patch Iran Wants To Kill

June 13, 2012

The U.S. Navy has completed work on a new version (3.6.1) of the software for its Aegis BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) system. A year ago 3.6.1 was successfully tested against an IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile), similar to those used by Iran. The IRBM was launched from Kwajalein Atoll (in the Marshall Islands) towards a patch of ocean off the Hawaiian Island, 3,700 kilometers distant. Within eleven minutes of the IRBM lift off, a long range X-Band radar on Wake Island (north of Hawaii) spotted the incoming missile, passed the data to a U.S. destroyer off Hawaii, which calculated the flight path of the target and launched a SM-3 Block 1A missile, which destroyed the IRBM. This was a test of the land based Aegis system that will be built in Europe to protect against hostile IRBMs. That system won’t work without 3.6.1.

The Aegis software upgrade (3.6.1) enables Aegis to track and intercept IRBMs (ballistic missiles with a range of 3,000-5,500 kilometers) as well as quickly share data with other radars. There are numerous other improvements, some of them classified.

This was the 21st successful test of Aegis, which now has an 84 percent success rate in tests. There are other upgrades in the works. Also, last year there was a 3.6.1 test with the new SM-3 Block 1B missile. This was mostly improvements in the final stage of warhead capabilities. While the 1B missile was not a complete success, the 3.6.1 software did what it was supposed to do.

At the moment Aegis anti-missile systems are hot. The U.S. government, encouraged by the high success rate of Aegis SM-3 tests, has been expanding the number of SM-3 equipped ships. With 27 Aegis anti-missile equipped ships in service now, there are plans to have nearly twice as many in the next few years. Nine of these ships will be upgraded to 3.6.1 over the next three years.

Converting Aegis ships to fire anti-missile missiles costs about $12 million a ship, mainly for new software and a few new hardware items. The new 3.6.1 software upgrade costs $50 million. Even with the sharp cost growth this is seen as a safe investment. To knock down ballistic missiles an Aegis equipped ship uses two similar models of the U.S. Navy Standard anti-aircraft missile, in addition to a modified version of the Aegis radar system, tweaked to also track incoming ballistic missiles.

The basic anti-missile missile RIM-161A, also known as the Standard Missile 3 (or SM-3), has a range of over 500 kilometers and max altitude of over 200 kilometers. The Standard 3 is based on the anti-missile version of the Standard 2 (SM-2 Block IV). This SM-2 missile turned out to be effective against ballistic missile warheads that are closer to their target. One test saw a SM-2 Block IV missile destroy a warhead that was only 19 kilometers up. An SM-3 missile can destroy a warhead that is more than ten times higher. But the SM-3 is only good for anti-missile work, while the SM-2 Block IV can be used against both ballistic missiles and aircraft. The SM-2 Block IV also costs less than half what an SM-3 costs.

The SM-3 has four stages. The first two boost the interceptor out of the atmosphere. The third stage fires twice to boost the interceptor farther beyond the earth’s atmosphere. Prior to each motor firing, it takes a GPS reading to correct it’s course for approaching the target. The fourth stage is the 20 pound LEAP kill vehicle, which uses infrared sensors to close on the target and ram it. The Aegis system was designed to operate aboard warships (cruisers and destroyers that have been equipped with the special software that enables the AEGIS radar system to detect and track incoming ballistic missiles). There is also a land based version that Israel is interested in buying and is basically the same one that would be installed in Europe.

Secrecy News

June 13, 2012


“The unauthorized release of classified information is a crime–it is a crime–because it threatens our national security and puts the lives of those who are sworn to defend our Nation in jeopardy,” said Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX) said on the Senate floor yesterday. “Everyone agrees [this] is criminal conduct.”

A resolution introduced by Sen. John McCain and twenty Republican colleagues calling for appointment of a special counsel to investigate recent leaks stated flatly that “the unauthorized disclosure of classified information is a felony under Federal law.”

But these statements are imprecise and misleading.  While some unauthorized disclosures of classified information are indeed contrary to law, it is not the case that all such disclosures violate the law.  In fact, there is no law that categorically prohibits the release of classified information.

“It must be acknowledged that there is no comprehensive statute that provides criminal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of classified information irrespective of the type of information or recipient involved,” wrote Attorney General John Ashcroft in an October 2002 report to Congress.

Significantly, AG Ashcroft added that “The President has the power under the Constitution to protect national security secrets from unauthorized disclosure. This extends to defining what information constitutes a national security secret and to determining who may have access to that secret.”

Likewise, according to the Congressional Research Service, “there is no one statute that criminalizes the unauthorized disclosure of any classified information…. It is possible that some of the government information… does not fall under the express protection of any statute, despite its classified status.”

Some types of classified information are specifically protected by law, including that pertaining to communications intelligence, identities of covert agents, and nuclear weapons design information.  But the Espionage Act statutes that have been used to prosecute most leak cases (18 USC 793, 794) do not mention “classified information” at all.  Rather, they apply to “national defense” information, an imprecise term that is not coextensive with “classified” information.

Even when “national defense” information that is clearly covered by the Act is disclosed to an unauthorized person, it does not necessarily follow that a crime has been committed.

Courts have interpreted the convoluted language of the Espionage Act to mean that only those with the requisite criminal intent will have violated the law.

In order to convict someone of unauthorized disclosure of national defense information (not involving disclosure of documents), Judge T.S. Ellis, III, the presiding judge in the AIPAC case, ruled in 2006 that it would be necessary for prosecutors “to demonstrate the likelihood of [the] defendant’s bad faith purpose to either harm the United States or to aid a foreign government.”

If White House officials disclosed classified information to reporters without authorization, it is doubtful that they intended to harm the United States or to aid a foreign government by doing so.

For these reasons, it is not true that “everyone agrees [this] is criminal conduct.”


New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following.

Mexican Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends, June 7, 2012

Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, June 8, 2012

International Monetary Fund: Background and Issues for Congress, June 12, 2012

The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, June 11, 2012

The American Opportunity Tax Credit: Overview, Analysis, and Policy Options, June 11, 2012

Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination in Employment: A Legal Analysis of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), June 8, 2012

Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations, June 6, 2012

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, June 8, 2012

Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, June 12, 2012

Interview with agent who caught US-Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard

June 11, 2012

Jonathan Pollard
Twenty-six years ago this month, a United States court convicted Jonathan Jay Pollard, a US Navy analyst who had been caught spying on his country for Israel. Pollard, who is still serving his life sentence, enjoys tremendous popularity in Israel as well as among pro-Israeli public figures in the US. His supporters in Israel and elsewhere view him as a hero who is serving an unfairly harsh sentence and they pressure the US government to release him. In light of that, it is worth paying attention to a recent radio interview with the man who caught him spying on America. The interview was conducted by Mike Lanchin, a reporter and producer for BBC radio’s Witness program. Lanchin managed to trace Ron Olive, a retired Assistant Special Agent at US Navy Counterintelligence, who in June 1986 cracked the Pollard case, leading to the spy’s arrest and eventual conviction. Olive, who now runs his own security consultancy firm in Arizona, told Witness that it took him and his fellow investigators over six months to piece together their case against Pollard. He added that, according to his investigation, “Pollard stole so many documents, so highly classified, more so than any other spy in the history of this country, in such a short period of time”. The case, said Olive, was the worst he had ever seen and it “devastated the entire [US] Intelligence Community”. The reason was not only the volume of stolen classified material, but also the fact that Pollard “could have been stopped from the very beginning”.

Olive’s investigation showed that Pollard contacted Israeli intelligence in 1984, almost immediately after he began working for the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Olive’s office was alerted after Pollard was seen leaving his office with a brown envelope under his arm by one of his ONI colleagues. Special Agent Olive’s initial reaction was dismissive; he apparently knew Pollard and did not think him smart enough to carry out espionage work. But he agreed to place Pollard under surveillance, which soon confirmed that the Navy analyst frequently left his office carrying with him brown envelopes stuffed with documents. Eventually, Olive joined a team of FBI agents that searched Pollard’s house, where they found a large volume of classified US government documents in Pollard’s bedroom closet and under his bed. In a subsequent interview, Pollard told counterintelligence agents that he would often take work material home because he did not have enough time to finish his administrative tasks at the office. Remarkably, according to Olive, the FBI agents “believed Pollard, and walked out of the case”.

But Olive persisted and wanted Pollard to undergo a lie detector test. After Pollard refused, Olive questioned him during a three-hour session, in which Pollard eventually cracked and confessed that he had been paid over $30,000 by his handlers —which he did not name— in return for spying on the US. Pollard was eventually arrested in 1985, after he and his wife Anne tried unsuccessfully to claim asylum at the Israeli embassy in Washington, DC. Olive ends the ten-minute interview by reminding listeners that “Pollard never, ever, in his life showed remorse for this”. As to why he thinks Pollard did what he did, Olive responds by stating: “What was motivating Jonathan Pollard was the number one thing that has motivated people to turn traitors and betray their country for decades and centuries: greed, money. Now, though, now he pretends that it was for the love of Israel, only. And now he has tens of thousands of supporters trying to get him out of jail”.